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HI don 't give a damn, he 'd do the same thing to me. It 's war! They don 't give a freakin 'you 
know what about you, they will kill you. They're out there to kill you, so I'm out there to kill 
them. If I didn't hurt him, he'd hurt me. They were gunnin 'for my legs, J'ma come right back at 
them ... I'm a *A#@#* soldier!"- Kellen Winslow, Jr., November 8, 20032 
"A concussion is as common in professional football as paper cuts are to a clerical staff "3 
I. Preface 
With the Coits desperately trying to chip away at the Eagles lead just before halftime, 
Austin Collie darted down the seam to catch a Peyton Manning pass before two defenders 
converged upon on him as if they were heat-seeking missiles. What happened next has become a 
familiar scene in the National Football League (NFL) on Sundays. Quintin Mikell and Kurt 
Coleman simultaneously hit Collie, and he lay motionless on the ground.4 Collie remained on 
the ground for several minutes before being taken off the field on a stretcher. 5 The image of 
Collie on the ground was so dire, CBS commentator Jim Nantz lamented, "Go play football, but 
let somebody have a life though okay?"6 The diagnosis that Collie had suffered a concussion 
was good news, considering the possible alternatives that seemed likely from the vicious tackle. 
Despite the consequences of the play, the NFL did not issue any fmes to the players involved7 
a11d some of Collie's tea.TILmates publicly stated that they thought the hit was legaL 8 A month 
prior, Colts President and competition committee member Bill Poliat?J. ·went so far as to dismiss 
the uproar over the big hits in the NFL and defend the tackling technique of defensive players.9 
It was clear that not only was there was no unanimity on the issue, but there was a stark contrast 
in the opinion over whether or not fierce hits and resulting concussions were an issue in the NFL. 
Austin Collie, drafted 12ih overall in the 2009 NFL draft, 10 had become one of Peyton 
Manning's favorite targets and an integral member of the Colts in his second year. He tried to 
return just two weeks after the concussion he suffered against the Eagles, but he was forced to 
leave that game in the first quarter with concussion-like symptoms. 11 By season's end the Colts 
were 7-6 and fighting for their playoff lives. Collie returned for the divisional rivalry game 
against the Jaguars in week fifteen, with first place on the line. He had one of the best starts to a 
game by a wide receiver in the NFL all year long, with eight catches for eighty-seven yards and 
two touchdowns before halftime. 12 Tragically, his eighth catch that day would be the last one he 
made all season. Just before the half, Collie attempted to catch a ball between two defenders and 
was hit with a forearm to the head by linebacker Daryl Smith. 13 For the second time in a few 
weeks, Collie lay motionless on the field for several minutes. It was his second concussion and 
the third time he left the game because of a head injury in just seven weeks. 14 Austin Collie's 
season was over.
15 
It is now well recognized that the NFL has a serious problem with protecting its players 
from concussions. It has been reported that the average concussion in professional football 
invoJ.ves a greater impact and a more forceful head velocity change than the average automotive 
accident. 16 Many former players have been forced to retire due to recurring concussions.17 
Many retired players have gone public, explaining how the repeated concussions they suffered 
during their playing careers had impacted their lives years later. 18 In 2010, the league's best 
comeback story and perhaps its most exciting player only got a chance to play because his 
teammate suffered a concussion.19 Ironically, respected commentators have gone so far as to 
compare the violence and injury inherent in the game of football to the repulsiveness of 
dogfighting. 20 
This paper will examine the concussion problem throughout the landscape of professional 
sports with a focus on the NFL. It will explore the NFL' s position on head injuries along with its 
position on how those injuries relate to cognitive decline later in life. It will review past NFL 
litigation and explore the potential causal link between head trauma and future health issues 
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being the impetus for future litigation, concluding that the NFL's concussion policy from 2005-
2009 may subject the league to liability from lawsuits by its former players. This paper will 
suggest ways for the NFL to avoid future litigation and more importantly, explain how the NFL 
can save itself by implementing procedures that will limit the impact of concussions on a 
player's future health and well-being. 
II. Introduction 
Scientists and the medical community have not agreed on a conclusive definition for a 
"concussion."21 It has quite simply been defined as "a physical injury to the head resulting in 
altered mental function, with expectation of recovery in 2-3 weeks."22 Additionally, several 
terms are used interchangeably to describe what is commonly known as a concussion.23 In 2001, 
the Concussion in Sport Group decided on the following definition: "A concussion is defmed as 
a complex pathophysiological process affecting the brain, induced by traumatic biomechanical 
forces. "24 Several common features that may be used to defme a concussive head injury include 
that: ( 1) it may be caused by a direct blow to the head, face, neck, or elsewhere on the body with 
an "impulsive" force transmitted to the head; (2) it typically results in the rapid onset of short 
lived impairment of neurological function that resolves spontaneously; (3) it may result in 
neuropathological changes but the acute clinical symptoms largely reflect a functional 
disturbance rather than structural injury; ( 4) it results in a graded set of clinical syndromes that 
may or may not involve loss of consciousness. Resolution of the clinical and cognitive symptoms 
typically follows a sequential course; and ( 5) it is typically associated with grossly normal 
structural neuroimaging studies.Z5 
Concussions can differ significantly in severity, thus making it problematic to classify all 
of them with a single term.26 There are at least forty-one different guidelines for grading a head 
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injury. 27 Furthermore, there is no universal agreement on the grading of a concussion, making 
the evaluation of epidemiological data very difficult?8 Nevertheless, it is recognized that a 
patient who has suffered a concussion may exhibit varying symptoms which may include: a 
feeling of being stunned or seeing bright lights, brief loss of consciousness, lightheadedness, 
vertigo, loss of balance, headaches, cognitive and memory dysfunction, tinnitus, blurred vision, 
difficulty concentrating, lethargy, fatigue, personality changes, inability to perform daily 
activities, sleep disturbances, and motor or sensory symptoms.29 Moreover, chronic traumatic 
encephalothopy ("CTE") is a fairly recently recognized condition believed to be caused by major 
collisions or the accumulation of subconcussions that are not as noticeable as the common 
concussion.30 In football, the development of CTE can result from the accumulation of collisions 
over the course of a player's career. 
Further complicating matters is that concussions and CTE often go undiagnosed because 
the symptoms of each are not always recognizable. 31 An anonymous retrospective survey 
conducted in 2005 revealed that many patients were not aware of whether or not they had 
suffered a concussion.32 Ninety-three of the 105 patients who had suffered a concussion had no 
idea they had been concussed.33 Additionally, an athlete may even ignore concussion-like 
symptoms in order to stay in the game, thus making them hard to monitor?4 Peyton Manning 
admitted that he would purposely do poorly on an initial memory test to allow him to stay in a 
game when the test would be administered on him after he took a hit?5 In the NFL, critics cite 
the strong competitive nature and pressure to perform as potential reasons that players ignore 
concussion-like symptoms or play before they are healthy. 36 Hall of fame linebacker Harry 
Carson blames the glorification of the "big hit" on television networks and periodicals that only 
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fan the flames and encourage younger players to strive to make the hits that will be featured on 
"SportsCenter. n37 
The Center for Disease Control and Prevention has estimated that as many as 3.8 million 
sports and recreation-related concussions occur in the United States each year.38 Other estimates 
specific to sports a."'1d treatment have estimated that over 300,000 sports= related concussions 
occur annually in the U.S.39 A recent study found that high school athletes were about four times 
more likely to suffer a concussion today than they were just a decade ago, with football being 
cited as the most dangerous sport.40 The American Academy of Pediatrics has released studies 
that suggest concussions suffered by children in sports are on the rise, as the amount of 
concussions has doubled from 1997-2007.41 Sadly, serious concussions have even caused more 
than a few fatalities among high school football players over the years.42 The bottom line is that 
concussions are extremely prevalent in sports. 
What is most troubling about this issue are the long-term healtt""l effects that are linked to 
concussions.43 Studies have found a strong correlation between the rate of diagnosed clinical 
depression among retired Nt'L players and the number of concussions they had sustained during 
their career.44 Some people have even speculated that concussions can lead to suicide.45 
Additionally, research has indicated that a history of previous concussions puts a player at a 
greater risk for future concussions, as well as the acute outcomes after a subsequent 
concussion.46 Suffering multiple concussions has also been associated with an increased risk of 
developing Alzheimer's disease and memory loss.47 A 2009 study by the University of 
Michigan's Institute for Social Research found that former NFL players are nineteen times more 
likely to develop Alzheimer's disease or other memory-loss diseases than other men between the 
ages of thirty and fifty.48 Recent studies also suggest that NFL players are eight to ten times 
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more likely than the average citizen of being diagnosed with amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS), 
the incurable neuromuscular disorder more commonly known as Lou Gehrig's disease.49 In the 
NFL, there were a reported 154 concussions through week eight of the 201 0 season, an increase 
of twenty-one percent over the prior year.50 These statistics manifest how the long-term effects 
of concussions can be deadly serious for many athletes. 51 
III. Concussion Issues Permeate the Professional Sports Landscape 
Boxing is the sport in which the participants' exposure to the risk of head trauma and 
concussions seems the most logical and easily recognizable. It is intuitive that in a sport where 
the objective is to knock out the opponent, its athletes risk injury to the brain. Commentators 
have credited the death ofDuk Koo Kim in 1982 for bringing the most extreme dangers of 
boxing to the public consciousness. 52 Kim's death prompted regulatory and legislative bodies 
around the nation to investigate boxing. 53 The investigation examined the long-term effects of 
boxing in addition to the short-term effects manifested by through the fate of~. The long-
term effects of boxing include memory loss, speech impairment, depression, and chronic 
encephalopathy, better known as "punch-drunk syndrome."54 
Football and hockey, however, are the two sports with the highest incidents of head 
trauma and concussions. 55 A study on head trauma in junior hockey found that the incidence of 
game-related concussions was seven times the rate found in 2005, with many concussions left 
unreported. 56 The concussion issue in hockey is also prevalent in the National Hockey League 
(NHL). NHL-star Eric Lindros was forced to retire prematurely in 2007 because he sustained at 
least seven concussions over the course of his career. 57 Lin.dros believed his history of 
concussions made him a marked man. "You basically have an X on your back," explained 
Lindros. "Players who hefore would never come at you, once they know about your 
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concussions, they will come at you, and with high elbows."58 Multiple concussions also cut short 
the NHL career of his brother Brett. In retrospect, Brett Lindros believes he did not have 
sufficient information about the dangers imposed by concussions and as a result, he did not take 
enough time off after suffering a concussion. 59 One NHL "enforcer" acknowledged that there 
were times that he got hit in the head during a fight and the next day he would just fall down 
during practice. His explanation was that, "I wasn't able to turn left."60 
The concussion issue in the NHL was made more public with the recent news that the 
brain of the late Bob Probert who died at the age of forty-five showed evidence ofCTE, the 
degenerative disease caused by repeated concussions. 61 This information caused some to debate 
whether the concussion problem can be addressed by banning fighting from hockey. 62 Sports 
medicine physician Paul Echlin believes that there is enough evidence that indicates a correlation 
between fighting and concussions, thus leading him to conclude that a ban on fighting is a way to 
address the numerous concussions in the 1'-~HL. 63 Fonner player Marty McSorley disagrees with 
this theory. McSorley suffered numerous concussions as a player and he presently deals with 
memory loss and other symptoms resulting from brain injury.64 Nevertheless, McSorley believes 
his cognitive issues are more likely attributable to the concussions he suffered while playing, 
since he only suffered one or two concussions from fighting. 65 
The NHL's biggest superstar and Olympic gold medalist Sidney Crosby has missed over 
half of the 201 0-2011 season due to a concussion, with no timetable for his return. 66 In an 
ironically unfortunate coincidence, his sister Taylor has recently suffered a similar fate while 
playing goalie for her hockey team.67 To its credit, the NHL seems to be taking the concussion 
issue seriously, as evidenced by comments from Commissioner Gary Bettman as well as the 
cautious approach the Penguins have taken with Sidney Crosby.68 Additionally, one former 
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player who suffered many concussions in his career recently agreed to posthumously donate his 
brain to BU medical school for research to help determine the long-term effects of his 
concussions. 69 
Concussion issues are not limited to the more physical, "contact" sports. Former Major 
League Baseball (MLB) MVP Justin Morneau sustained a season-ending concussion trying to 
break up a double play. Eight months later, he still has lingering symptoms and has yet to play 
in a game.70 The Mets' Jason Bay suffered a concussion in July of2010 when he collided with a 
padded bar in the outfield, going full speed, attempting to catch a fly bal1.71 Bay played in the 
next two games before missing the remainder of the season with post-concussion symptoms.72 It 
is no surprise that the Mets used caution with Bay, since they were heavily criticized just a few 
years earlier for the manner in which the organization handled the concussion of Ryan Church.73 
Baseball equipment manufacturers have attempted to reduce the number of concussions to 
players through product innovation. Rawlings released its newest batting helmet, the S-1 00, in 
August of 2009.74 The helmet has a bulkier, more protective design than past models and is built 
to withstand the impact of a 1 OO-mph fastball. 75 
Other major sports in which the players wear minimal equipment and no head gear have 
similarly not been able to escape the issues that result from concussions. Concussions in soccer 
can occur when a player "heads" the ball, but they occur more often when two players' heads 
collide as they battle for a ball in the air.76 A study presented at the American College of Sports 
Medicine Meeting revealed that athletes with a history of multiple concussions are much more 
likely to suffer from impaired balance after repeated purposeful heading of a soccer ball. 77 The 
NBA, a league in which its players wear no equipment, recently lost all-star point guard Chris 
Paul to a concussion when he collided with an opponent's shoulder.78 Paul left the court on a 
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stretcher. 79 It has since been reported that the NBA has been consulting with an independent 
neurologist and may establish a new league-wide policy for handling concussions by next 
season. 80 Beyond the traditional sports, experts have speculated that although staged, head 
injuries have serious and perhaps fatal repercussions in professional wrestling as well. 81 
A l+ho,..or e"'Ch """"0...+ han hoo.,... a:r+-"oc+od h·u haad ill• ~lnn··eS -"not'holl hoc:o thP lnflrTPSt gnr1 mo(1t 
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problematic history with respect to concussions. 82 Concussions are currently one of the most 
hotly-debated issues in football. The game of football is tied to violence, as evidenced by a 
former player's suggestion that trying to remove the violence from football is like trying to 
remove the trees from a forest. 83 The remainder of this paper will examine the potential liability 
of various entities as a result of the concussions suffered by NFL players. With the NFL being 
the first major sport forced to confront the concussion issue, the other sports have the benefit to 
learn from the NFL's mistakes. 
IV. Civil Liability in Tort and the Standard of Care- Legal Issues Related to 
Concussions 
A. TbeNFL 
Sports injuries that occur as a result of competition are not typically tortious in nature. 
Injuries are viewed as part of the inherent risks of playing the game. Yet, the tortious behavior 
of various actors or entities involved in sports can cause athletic injuries. 84 An injured athlete 
can base a cause of action on one of three theories: (1) an intentional tort such as battery or 
assault, (2) recklessness, or (3) negligence. 85 In the common negligence lawsuit, a plaintiff must 
prove duty, breach, causation, and damages.86 The focus of this paper will the potential tortious 
liability based only upon negligence as it applies to the NFL and its teams, team physicians, and 
helmet manufacturers. 
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An employer is defined as ''a person who controls and directs a worker under an express 
or implied contract of hire and who pays the worker's salary or wages."87 An employee is "a 
person who works in the service of another person (the employer) under an express or implied 
contract of hire, under which the employer has the right to control the details of work 
performance."88 The NFL and its teams are the employers of the individual players, who are 
considered the labor. A duty of reasonable care is necessary to establish liability if a ''special 
relationship" is found to exist between a plaintiff and a defendant. 89 "Some generally recognized 
special relationships include common carrier-passenger, innkeeper-guest, employer-employee, 
landlord-tenant, and invitor-invitee."90 Thus, the employer-employee relationship is viewed as a 
"special relationship" upon which the duty of reasonable care can be based. 91 
When a principal has a special relationship with an agent, the principal owes the agent a 
duty of reasonable care with regards to the risks arising out of that relationship.92 In a special 
relationship, the employee entrusts himself to the control and protection of his employer, thus the 
duty to protect is imposed upon the employer because he is in the best position to provide a safe 
workplace for the employee.93 To determine whether a duty is imposed on an employer by a 
"special relationship," it must be determined if the plaintiff-employee entrusted himself to the 
defendant, without the opportunity of control to protect himself.94 To determine that, "it is 
necessary to balance the societal interests involved, the severity of the risk, the burden upon the 
defendant, the likelihood of the occurrence, and the relationship between the parties."95 Other 
factors include, "the defendant's ability to comply with the proposed duty] the victim's inability 
to protect himself from the harm, the costs of providing protection, and whether the plaintiff has 
bestowed some economic benefit on the defendant."96 
B. Team Physicians 
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Team physicians can potentially be liable to players under the tort of negligence, which 
can result from medical malpractice. To bring a successful lawsuit against a team physician for a 
concussion-related negligence action, the NFL player would have to establish the following 
elements: 1) a duty owed to the plaintiffbased upon doctor-patient relationship; 2) a breach of 
the standard of care; 3) an injury; and 4) a causal connection between the breach and the injury.97 
Typically, all professional and collegiate teams employ a team physician to provide 
medical care to its athletes. The primary concern of the team physician must be to provide the 
best medical care to the athletes.98 The duties of a team physician include, but are not limited to 
the following: 1) coordinate pre-participation screening; 2) manage injuries on the field; 3) 
provide for medical management of injury and illness; 4) provide for appropriate education and 
counseling regarding nutrition, strength and conditioning, ergogenic aids, substance abuse, and 
other medical problems that could affect the athlete; and 5) coordinate rehabilitation and return 
to participation.99 
The physician-patient relationship between the physician and player requires the 
physician to provide medical treatment and advice consistent with an athlete's best health 
interests.1 00 Regardless of any pressure team physicians may feel from management, coaches, 
fans, or athletes, their decisions should be governed solely by medical considerations. 101 The 
physician and player also share a fiduciary relationship in addition to the physician-patient 
relationship.102 The fiduciary relationship makes the physician responsible for fully disclosing 
the extent of all injuries to the player. Any concealment or misrepresentation can subject the 
physician to liability for fraud. 103 In Cobbs, the California Supreme Court recognized the 
patient's right to disclosure of information necessary to give consent to medical treatment. 104 
Pertinent information includes the risk ofbodily harm, problems of recuperation, and an 
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explanation of complications that may occur from surgery. 105 This undoubtedly applies to 
information relating to head injuries sustained during a football game. In malpractice suits 
involving a physician, the trend is to apply the national standard of care; the applicable legal 
standard of conduct is "good medical practice" within the physician's area of expertise. 106 
C.. Equipment Manufacturers 
Negligence-based lawsuits in sports can also involve equipment manufacturers. The 
most prevalent litigation involving football equipment involves helmet manufacturers. 107 
Litigation is so common that the high cost of liability insurance has significantly decreased the 
amount of companies that manufacture football helmets.108 The business had become so 
unprofitable that by 1987 only two companies were manufacturing football helmets for 
professional, collegiate, and high school players. 109 Today, the exclusive provider of football 
helmets for the NFL is Riddell. 11 0 
Theories of liability against equipment manufacturers can be based on negligence or strict 
liability. Allegations of negligence typically focus on negligent design, manufacture or a failure 
to warn. 111 In this context, a duty means the duty of a manufacturer to warn the player or to 
refrain from producing or selling a defective helmet.112 The focus on a failure to warn case is 
often causation; for instance, whether an adequate warning on the helmet would have prevented 
an injury. A negligent suit based on a design defect may be a more difficult standard for the 
plaintiff since design defect cases involve proof of helmet testing and expert battles.113 
Section 402A of the Restatement of Torts explains strict liability: (1) One who sells any 
product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer is subject to 
liability for physical harm thereby caused to the user or consumer if (a) the seller is engaged in 
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the business of selling such a product, and (b) it is expected to and does reach the user or 
consumer without substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.114 A plaintiff must 
prove that the helmet manufacturer (1) is a supplier of the product; (2) the product was defective 
in design or condition and thus unreasonably dangerous; (3) the defect existed when the product 
left the defendant's control; and (4) the condition was the proximate cause ofthe plaintiff's 
physical injury. 115 ~~unreasonably dangerous" is explained in comment i as meaning that the 
product must be dangerous to an extent beyond which an ordinary consumer would 
contemplate.116 Comment j reveals that a supplier may be required to give a warning to prevent 
its product from being considered "unreasonably dangerous."117 
V. A Brief Overview of Lawsuits Brought Against the NFL 
A. Merril Hoge 
Former NFL running back and current ESPN TV analyst Merril Hoge has stated that he 
literally died from a concussion before the Bears' doctors were able to resuscitate him.118 He 
explained: 
Wnen I came to the sideiine, I was never unconscious. 1¥1y facernask had been bent. They 
were switching my facemask and realized cognitively I was not responding properly. 
They take me to the training room where I died-- I tlat-lined. My heart stopped. In the 
process of trying to resuscitate me, I started to breathe again. Now, they rushed me to the 
emergency room. I was in ICU for two days, but it was after that I was basically trapped 
in my home for six weeks. You could not take me around the block, and I would not be 
able to find my way home because I did not have the cognitive skills. I had to learn how 
to read again. In fact, months later if you would sit me down and take the inventory of the 
day I would not be able to recite that to you. So, there is a lot of cognitive issues that I 
dealt with, at"ld it took aL-nost two years to overcome those particular issues. 119 
Ten days after suffering his second concussion of 1994, Hoge continued to suffer from post-
concussion symptoms, such as dizziness, lethargy, sleepiness, memory loss, and headaches. 120 
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Hoge was forced to prematurely retire in 1994 after just eight seasons because of the concussions 
he had suffered that same year. 121 
The team's treatment of his concussions led to the lawsuit Hoge filed in 1996 against the 
physician employed by the Chicago Bears. Hoge alleged that the medical trainer negligently 
allowed him to return to the field with post-concussion symptoms and failed to warn him of the 
increased risk of suffering a second concussion that he became susceptible to by re-entering the 
game. Furthermore, Hoge alleged that he was allowed to go back into the game without a 
follow-up examination.122 He also argued that he would not have returned to play until he 
completely recovered from the first concussion if he had been aware of his post-concussion 
condition, and thus would have remained a salary-earning player. 123 Incredibly, Hoge's lawsuit 
is the only one on record that involves a plaintiff-athlete suing an NFL affiliated party. 124 He 
received a successful verdict against the medical trainer and was awarded approximately $1.5 
.11' 125 rm ton. 
B. Mike Webster 
The NFL has also been subject to several lawsuits arising from its Retirement Board's 
denial of disability benefits to its former players. 126 In such cases, federal courts use an abuse of 
discretion standard to determine if benefits were improperly denied.127 To overcome this 
substantial burden, the retired player would have to prove that the Retirement Board's finding 
was "arbitrary and capricious, unsupported by substantial evidence, instituted in bad faith, or 
erroneous on a question oflaw."128 Making matters harder for the plaintiff, the Retirement Plan 
administrators have given significant freedom in interpreting the evidence and their decision is 
accorded substantial deference. 129 
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Mike ''Iron Mike" Webster was a late-round pick of the Pittsburgh Steelers who became 
one of the best centers in NFL history. 130 He played on four Super Bowl winning teams and 
made the Pro Bowl nine times. 131 Webster played in 150 consecutive games and had a six-year 
stretch where he did unbelievably did not miss a single down. 132 He retired in 1991 and was 
elected to the Hall of Fame in 1997. Webster died in 2002 at 50 years old.133 
Over the course of his career, Webster took many shots to the head and sustained 
multiple concussions. 134 Although his death was linked to heart disease, much of the attention 
after his death was focused on his mental state, which one doctor described as that of a "punch-
drunk boxer."135 A "punch-drunk boxer" is a common description for someone who suffers from 
chronic traumatic encephalopathy (CTE). In 2002, Mike Webster was the first person ever to be 
diagnosed with CTE.136 Dr. Bennet Omalu, a forensic pathologist and neuropathologist who 
examined Webster's brain, believes he has proven that repeated concussions in football lead to 
early-onset dementia, as evidence by what happened to Webster. 137 Ira Casson, a neurologist 
and former co-chairman of the NFL concussion committee has dismissed Omalu's conclusions 
as inconclusive and erroneous in regard to Webster and other former players. 138 
Webster struggled to hold a job after his career and eventually applied for disability 
benefits under the NFL Retirement Plans, applying for active football benefits and, in the 
alternative, football degenerative benefits. 139 The crux of the issue was figuring out exactly 
when Webster became totally disabled. 140 The case included a complex amount of facts and 
dates in addition to conflicting expert testimony between Webster and the NFL. 141 Webster 
submitted comprehensive evidence which suggested that his disabilities began while he was still 
actively playing football, and thus he should have been entitled to disability benefits. 142 The 
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defendant argued that since no doctor had evaluated Webster until 1997, the exams were not 
timely and thus speculative and conclusory. 143 
The court found that the Retirement Board had ignored the findings of every medical 
expert who examined Webster and had disregarded the fmdings of its own investigator in 
reaching the decision to deny him benefits. 144 Both the factual circumstances of Mike Webster's 
life along with the medical testimony presented by his estate proved to be decisive in rendering 
his estate the winning verdict. 145 Mike Webster's estate became the first applicant to win a 
reversal of a benefits decision in federal court.146 The significance of this case should not be 
minimized since the NFLPA's own director had been publicly unsympathetic to the plight of 
former players. 147 The important question now is whether this decision will change the way that 
courts evaluate disability plan cases and as a result whether the NFL will be susceptible to 
increased causes of action brought by its retired players. 148 
VI. The Potential Liability of the NFL and its franchises 
A. Recent Tragedy & Independent Studies: Waters, Johnson, and Duerson 
Fifty years from now, it is likely that football historians will mark 2005 as the year things 
began to change for the NFL. In 2005, independent scientists performed various 
neuropathological and clinical studies that demonstrated multiple NFL concussions cause 
cognitive problems such as depression and dementia.149 Since then, several researchers have 
become pioneers on the issue, studying the brains of various former professional athletes.150 
Their fmdings were the driving force behind the change in the NFL concussion policy that was 
instituted just last year. 151 In 2005, the NFL had many policies and rules in place to protect its 
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players but none that dealt specifically with head trauma. The NFL left those decisions to each 
of its individual teams. 152 
Since 2005, the concussion issue has received increased public attention and scrutiny. 
The increased public attention can be attributed to three main factors. The frrst is the seemingly 
increased violent nature of the gatue. 153 Second, cu1"Tent players began to publicly speak out on 
the issue more than they had in the past.154 Third and perhaps most importantly, the studies of 
former athletes' brains has revealed a significant correlation between head trauma and health 
problems.155 By 2009, researchers at the Center for the Study of Traumatic Encephalopathy 
(CSTE) confirmed that a sixth former player was found to have CTE, a type of brain damage that 
is incredibly rare among the general population.156 These players include Mike Webster, Andre 
Waters, Terry Long, John Grimsley, Justin Strzelczyk, and Tom McHale. 157 The CSTE 
announced that McHale was suffering from CTE when he died and that he had a brain condition 
similar to Alzheimer's disease.158 McHale's cause of death was an apparent drug overdose, 
while Grimsley died of an accidental gunshot wound to the chest. Webster, Long, and 
Strzelczyk died after long fights with depression.159 Andre Waters committed suicide in 2006 at 
the age offorty-four. 160 
Waters' suicide led to a watershed, front page news article in the New York Times that 
exposed the issue to the world.161 Nicknamed Andre "Dirty" Waters by Dan Dierdorf, he joined 
the Philadelphia Eagles in 1984 as an undrafted free agent. 162 Waters was a violent and reckless 
player who quickly gained the reputation as a ferocious hitter, incurring many league fines 
throughout his career. 163 Not surprisingly, he also suffered numerous concussions during his 
career.
164 Waters played in an era when NFL doctors minimized the significance ofhead 
injuries. 165 When the co-founder of the Sports Legacy Institute Chris Nowinski166 Iearned of 
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Waters' suicide, he requested Waters' brain for research but the coroner refused. 167 However, 
Waters' niece Kwana Pittman was influential in persuading reluctant members of his family to 
let the researchers analyze his brain and they were able to salvage small chunks of Waters' brain 
to study. 168 Dr. Bennet Omalu found the same red streaks in Waters' brain as he had found in 
the brains of former players Webster and Long. 169 Omalu's research also found that Waters' 
brain had significantly deteriorated and that the damage was either caused or accelerated by 
successive concussions.170 He concluded that Waters' brain damage resulted from his career as 
an NFL player, which led to his depression and suicide.171 Quite significantly, this expert 
blamed the suicide directly on the concussions he sustained while playing football. 
In addition to the significant research that has been conducted over the past six years, 
former players are now more willing to publicly discuss the significance of concussions. Former 
New England Patriot linebacker Ted Johnson believes concussions have led to his severe 
depression and addiction to amphetamines. 172 Johnson points to 2002, when he suffered back-to-
hack concussions, as the origin of his problems which have also resulted in sleeping disorders 
and mental fatigue. 173 He alleges that his coach Bill Belichick went against the recommendation 
of the team trainer and exposed him to on-field contact during a practice just four days after he 
suffered a concussion in a preseason game. 174 Belichick placed the blame on Johnson for not 
communicating that there was a problem.175 However, since NFL contracts are not guaranteed, 
players often feel pressured to play at any cost. Interestingly, the Patriots would not allow trainer 
Jim Whalen to comment on the story. 176 Quite prophetically, Johnson expressed his fear of 
somebody being the "next Andre Waters."177 
Former four-time NFL Pro Bowler Dave Duerson was fifty years old when he shot 
himself in the heart on February 17,2011, sending shockwaves throughout the league. 178 It was 
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no ordinary suicide, if there is such a thing. After deciding to commit suicide, he shot himself in 
the chest, seemingly to preserve his brain for research. 179 His intent was strongly implied by text 
messages he sent to his family 180 and the note he left prior to his suicide. The note implored the 
flrst person who found it to, "Please, see that my brain is given to the NFL's brain bank."181 
Although the news of his suicide itself did not come as a shock to mat1y, 182 the outrage and 
horror from the public and former players has been directed at the manner in which Duerson 
committed suicide. 183 Commentators have called Duerson an apparent martyr for a cause, with 
the possibility that his death could be a turning point for NFL. 184 The NFL has undoubtedly 
taken a different approach to concussions over the last year, as evidenced by its $1 million 
donation to the CSTE, the group that will now examine Duerson's brain for the effects of 
CTE.185 Many retired players in addition to Duerson have pledged to donate their brains for 
research. 186 
B. The NFL's 2005-2009 Position on Concussions and Their Effect on Future Health 
It is uncertain whether this different approach can save the NFL from potential liability 
for its past treatment of its concussion problem. The Nt·L has commissioned various studies 
over the years that have resulted in significant and disputed fmdings. One such study placed a 
majority of the blame for concussions on helmet-to-helmet hits, attributing 61 percent of all NFL 
concussions to those types ofhits. 187 As a result, the NFL implemented rules and policies to 
police helmet-to-helmet hits. The most controversial and debated of the studies was a thirteen-
part study commissioned by the NFL' s Mild Traumatic Brain Injury (MTBI) Committee which 
was published in Neurosurgery Journal and relied upon heavily by Commissioner Roger Goodell 
to create the NFL's new Guidelines for Concussion Management in August of2007.188 
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The most controversial and relevant of the studies focused on repeated head trauma 
injuries, neuropsychological testing of players, and when a player should return to the same 
game. 189 The MTBI committee concluded that both "single and repeated concussions can be 
managed conservatively with rest, and most players can return quickly to play."190 
Commentators stated that the NFL should take notice of the widespread criticism over the 
studies, as its research may be flawed and incomplete.191 This criticism is especially plausible 
since the NFL' s lead researcher was a rheumatologist, not a neurologist, who admitted he was 
not on expert on concussions. 192 Making matters worse for the NFL has been its outright 
reluctance to accept or consider the findings of independent researchers. 193 
The NFL continued to raise ambiguity about the long-term effects of concussions prior to 
2009, refusing to accept the majority academic opinion which implicated a causal link between 
concussions and cognitive decline. 194 In a statement released in August 2007 after its first 
"Concussion Summit," the NFL advised its players that they will not suffer long-term medical 
effects if they manage concussions properly, thus denying a causal link existed between 
concussions and CTE.195 Dr. Kevin Guskiewicz' s findings concluded that players who suffered 
at least three concussions had a five times greater chance to have Mild Cognitive Impainnent.196 
Nevertheless, the NFL also took the position that a player is not at greater risk for a further injury 
once he receives medical care for the concussion. 197 This stance may expose the NFL to 
potential future litigation and liability. 
The combination of unflattering studies and media pressure culminated in a climactic 
turning point for the NFL in 2009. The House Judiciary Committee decided to hold a 
Congressional hearing in October of2009 to discuss "the impact of head injuries and what can 
be done to limit them and compensate the players and their families." 198 The Committee 
20 
questioned Commissioner Goodell extensively, making him read from the pamphlet the NFL 
gave to its players, "Current research with professional athletes has not shown that having more 
than one or two concussions leads to permanent problems if each injury is managed properly. It 
is important to understand that there is no magic number for how many concussions is too 
many.'' 199 In what amounted to significant admonishment of its study, the Comnrittee compared 
the league's approach to science with the tobacco industry's approach to the public's health 
concerns with smoking. 200 Ira Casson, the co-chair of the NFL's Committee on Mild Traumatic 
Brain Injury, was inexplicably unavailable to testify in person. The Committee did, however, 
play a recording of Dr. Casson from HBO Real Sports in which he denied any links between 
head injuries and later cognitive decline?01 Dr. Casson resigned his position with the NFL just a 
few months after the Congressional hearing. 202 
C. The 2009 Congressional Hearing Leads to a Change in NFL Policy 
The Congressional Hearing seemed to cause an overhaul of the NFL concussion policy, 
as wholesale changes followed in the wake of the hearing. For the first time ever, a league 
official had publicly acknowledged the long-term health effects of concussions.203 It was at that 
point that the NFL decided to pledge $1 million to the CSTE.204 Effective December 2009, the 
NFL officially instituted a new concussion policy. The policy expanded the list of symptoms 
that, if recognized, would preclude a player from returning to the game.205 
A player who suffers a concussion should not return to play or practice on the same day if 
any of the following symptoms or signs is identified based on the initial medical 
evaluation of the player: Loss of consciousness; Confusion as evidenced by disorientation 
to person, time or place; Inability to respond appropriately to questions; or Inability to 
remember assignments or plays; Amnesia as evidenced by a gap in memory for events 
occurring just prior to the injury; Inability to learn and retain new information; or a gap in 
memory for events that occurred after the injury; Abnormal neurological examination, 
such as abnormal pupillary response, persistent dizziness or vertigo, or abnormal balance 
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on sideline testing; or A new and persistent headache, particularly if accompanied by 
photosensitivity, nausea, vomiting or dizziness; Any other persistent signs or symptoms 
of concussion."206 
After the policy was implemented, both Vikings center Matt Birk and Saints tight end 
Ernie Conwell each said that they had demanded to go back into a game after a head injury, only 
to have trainers hide their helmets to keep them on the sideline?07 In a 2010 game, Dallas 
Cowboy tight end Jason Witten was visibly upset with trainers for not allowing him to re-enter 
the game after suffering a big hit?08 In advance of the 2011 NFL season, the league produced a 
poster that warned its players of the long-term effects of concussions, using terms such 
depression and dementia. 209 The NFL mandated that the poster be hung in every locker room 
across the league. The NFL also increased punishment for helmet-to-helmet hits, saying it would 
consider suspending and fining its players. Three players alone were fined $175,000 in one 
weekend?10 The NFL's next move was to implement standardized sideline testing to diagnose 
concussions for the 2011 season, which will require all thirty-two teams to implement the same 
baseline testing for concussions on the sideline?11 
Despite its efforts, the NFL has still been heavily criticized for the way it has handled its 
concussion problem since 2009. In June of201 0, the NFL had another hearing before the House 
Judiciary Committee in which the House Panel criticized its two new co-chairmen on the 
Committee on Head Injuries?12 They were accused of sounding like the "same old NFL." 
Congressman Anthony Weiner was particularly critical, explaining that he was troubled that the 
new doctors were so unprepared that they could not even answer basic questions that dealt with 
helmets?13 The NFL has not handled its concussion problem in the best manner possible, but 
can it be held liable by former players? 
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D. Potential Liability for the NFL 
The NFL has been on notice of the potential causal links between concussions and 
cognitive impairment since the fmdings of independent medical studies were released in 2005. 
Despite the published studies, the NFL continued to deny that a causal link existed until2009.214 
The :t~FL may be subject to tort liability based on negligence for its concussion policy from 2005 
to 2009, specifically for its reliance on its own flawed study. As previously discussed, since it is 
established that a court would likely fmd that a special relationship exists between the NFL and 
its players,215 it is prudent to start the analysis with an examination of the duty owed by the NFL 
to its players. 
A duty to warn exists through a special relationship when one should realize that an act or 
omission exposed another to unreasonable risk ofharm.216 Comment (c) to §302 states that an 
actor may be negligent in failing to prevent harm to another resulting from his failure to control a 
force already in action. T.nus, an NFL player can argue that the NFL failed to warn him that he 
was at risk for serious cognitive disability. The player can argue that he was exposed to an 
unreasonable risk of harm by relying on the NFL' s study conducted by the MTBI Committee. 
The NFL relied on its study to make recommendations for the treatment of head injuries to its 
players.217 If a reasonable person would recognize an act as involving risk of harm to another, 
that risk is unreasonable if its magnitude outweighs the utility of the act.218 Here, the potential 
for harm is extraordinary, such that the magnitude of risk to the player is extremely high. 
Although the league can take the position that it did not know of the risks at the time, it 
can be argued that a reasonable person should have known of the risks of permanent cognitive 
damage from concussions. This can be inferred frorr1 the differences in the two documents 
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distributed to the players in 2007 and 2009.219 The 2007 release stated, ''"Current research with 
professional athletes has not shown that having more than one or two concussions leads to 
permanent problems if each injury is managed properly. It is important to understand that there is 
no magic number for how many concussions is too many."220 League spokesman Greg Aiello 
contradicted this position just two years later, "It's quite obvious from the medical research 
that's been done that concussions can lead to long-term problems."221 This had amounted to a 
tacit acknowledgment that the NFL was no longer able to defend a position that conflicted with 
nearly all scientific understanding of head trauma. If a player suffered numerous concussions 
prior to 2009 which end up causing health issues in the future, the NFL can potentially be liable 
for its failure to warn the player of the health risks arising from multiple concussions. This is 
especially true if the player asserts that he relied on the NFL's position and returned to the game 
earlier then he should have. Therefore, a player will likely be able to establish the duty element 
of negligence. 
The experiences of Ted Johnson and Wayne Chrebet illustrate a breach of this duty. Ted 
Johnson was practically forced to return to practice against his will, not having full knowledge of 
the increased health risk to which he was exposing himself. He potentially made himself 
susceptible to a lifetime of health issues by getting back on the field. Similarly, Wayne Chrebet 
lost consciousness for a few minutes after he suffered a concussion in a game in November of 
2003?22 Irresponsibly, he was cleared to re-enter the game based solely on his declaration that 
he was fme. 223 It follows that either player has a cause of action of negligence against the NFL 
for ~ts policy that placed them at risk. 
The NFL would likely be precluded from avoiding the duty element by arguing that 
p]ayers are employees of the teams and not the NFL according to §42 of the Restatement. §42 of 
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the Restatement explains that once an actor begins to render voluntary service to a third party, 
the actor undertakes a duty to proceed with reasonable care if relied upon by the third party.224 
The creation of the MTBI Committee and subsequent concussion study by the committee can be 
understood as a voluntary service provided by the NFL to it players. The NFL caused players to 
rely on the information distributed to them in which the NFL ack11owledged that it wanted to 
make sure its players were fully informed about the potential impact of concussions?25 
Consequently, an NFL player can argue the NFL breached its duty of care when it failed to warn 
him about the long-term risks of concussions. 
To state a cause of action against the league, an NFL player would also have to establish 
causation. The player would have to prove that the NFL's conduct was the cause of his health 
problems.226 The conduct by the NFL only has to be one of the causes of the player's health 
issues. 227 Therefore, the plaintiff would not have to prove that the NFL' s conduct was the only 
cause of the harm, but just that it was one of the causes. .A .. player ·would have to prove that his 
health issues were caused by repeated blows to the head during his career. As previously 
mentioned, the player can argue that the NFL's failure to warn of the causal link between head 
trauma and later cognitive decline caused him to rely on that information, thus leading to his 
subsequent health issues. For example, if a player sustained a head injury between the years 
2005-2009228 and he relied on information provided by the NFL to return to play before he 
should have, he likely can prove a cause of action against the NFL based on negligence. As 
discussed briefly in Section IV, commentators have acknowledged the similarities in the 
positions taken by the NFL and the tobacco industry in downplaying potential health problems in 
their respective industries. 229 Both formed research committees to refute evidence that would 
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pose a monetary risk to its success. Like the tobacco industry, the NFL had denied the existence 
of a causal link by attempting to discredit independent studies. 230 
The NFL will put forth an assumption of risk defense. It will argue that a player assumed 
the risk of injury by playing football.. In Vendrell v. School District No. 26C, the court denied 
the plaintiff recovery by fmding that the plaintiff assumed the inherent and obvious risk of injury 
in being tackled. 231 Legendary coach Bill Parcells has stated publicly that players are well 
aware that football is hazardous to their health?32 After all, everyone involved with football 
understands that serious injury is a possibility. However, even if a player understood the risks of 
suffering concussions by playing football, it does not mean he had the same knowledge that the 
NFL had. Thus, the player was not fully aware that he was making himself susceptible to long-
term health consequences when he re-entered the game. Had he known, he would have chosen 
to sit out. The NFL continued to inform its players that there was no evidence to suggest 
concussions caused cognitive decline until2009, thus increasing the danger to its players by 
failure to disclose and address the issue. Given its historical denial of a causal link between head 
trauma and cognitive decline along with its rel~ance on a flawed study, it is plausible that a 
player can prove duty, breach, causation, and damages in a lawsuit against the NFL despite any 
defenses offered by the league. 
It is likely the NFL would also argue contributory negligence by the player in that he had 
negligently contributed to his own injury. Although it shares similarities to the assumption of 
risk doctrine, contributory negligence is a separate defense. 233 Assumption of risk questions a 
plaintiff's actual knowledge of danger, while contributory negligence focuses on the fault of a 
plaintiff and whether his or her conduct was reasonable. 234 Contributory negligence is defined as 
when a plaintiffs own negligence played a part in causing the injury and that the role is found to 
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be significant enough to bar a plaintiff from recovering damages. 235 If the jurisdiction does not 
recognize contributory negligence, the NFL would derivatively adopt comparative negligence as 
its defense, which reduces a plaintiff's damages by the percentage the plaintiff is deemed 
responsible for the injury ?36 
The NFL can argue that a player was complicit in contributing to his inj~~; by re1lhT..ing 
to play too early or hiding his concussion by failing to report his symptoms. Almost 20 percent 
of players polled in November 2009 admitted that they had underreported concussion 
symptoms?37 Players admitted they returned to play "feeling 'dazed' or 'woozy' or having 
blurred vision."238 For example, fullback Kevin Turner admitted he once got hit so hard that he 
did not know what city he was in, yet he still went back into the game.239 In response, a player 
would try to justify his actions as necessary based on the NFL' s contract policy which does not 
guarantee contracts. This defense has potential success for the NFL provided that it can show 
the player acted independently in concealing his injury in an attempt to return to the game. 
However, it will have the same issue previously discussed if the player claims he concealed his 
injury in reliance on the study that suggested he was not put at further risk of health injury by 
sustaining another concussion. 
Alternatively and more aggressively, an athlete can allege fraudulent concealment by the 
N""FL. This can be argued through a misrepresentation claim. To prove a cause of action based 
on misrepresentation, a plaintiff must prove: 1) misrepresentation or general omission of a fact; 
2) the fact asserted was known by the defendant to be false; 3) the defendant made the assertion 
with the intent the plaintiff would rely on the assertion; 4) the plaintiff justifiably relied; and 5) 
was injured as a result?40 The player can argue fraudulent misrepresentation regarding the press 
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release on August 14, 2007.241 If the NFL chooses to disclose anything at all, it likely had a duty 
to disclose complete and accurate information. 
The NFL was aware of the independent studies which suggested there was a link between 
concussions and long-term health issues, since it had publicly refuted the studies on numerous 
occasions.242 Thus, the league did not disclose complete and accurate information. A plaintiff 
can attempt to prove that the NFL purposely concealed the fmdings of the independent studies 
which took a different position than the one asserted by the NFL. Had the player been aware of 
the health risks, perhaps he would have considered retirement before returning to play. This type 
of fraudulent claim would be disastrous for the NFL, as substantive punitive damages would be 
likely if a player won this type of suit.243 The biggest hurdle a player would face is proving that 
the NFL made the assertion with the intent that a player would rely on the information. A fraud 
case can only succeed if the plaintiff establishes that a reasonable person would have believed 
and acted on the NFL' s misrepresentations. 244 The NFL will argue that the players had enough 
anecdotal evidence and recent studies to be well informed. Despite its potential arguments, it is 
clear that the NFL did not do enough to warn players of the neurological problems that can result 
from repeated blows to the head. It also warrants mentioning that in either action, the NFL may 
also be susceptible to a loss of consortium claim brought by a player's wife.245 
Regardless of the potential future claims that may be filed against the NFL, the league did 
correctly change its position, even if it was too late. By publicly accepting the scientific opinion 
that a causal link exists between concussions and later cognitive disability, the NFL has 
undeniably put itself in a better legal position to dispute negligence claims. As of2009, a player 
will not be able to claim that the NFL failed to warn him of the potential future risks that 
repeated concussions can lead to cognitive decline. Merril Hoge, who has publicly criticized the 
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NFL for its concussion policy and was successful in his lawsuit, acknowledged the significant 
changes made by the league. 246 He commented that what happened to him would not happen in 
the NFL today?47 Although it can be faulted for its concussion policy in the past, the NFL has 
come a long way since it implemented baseline testing for concussions in 1995.248 
VII.. The Potential Liability of NFL Team Physicians 
The NFL is not the only defendant who may be liable to a player for health injuries 
sustained from concussions. Typically, if a physician-patient relationship exists and the 
diagnosis or treatment is inconsistent with the accepted standard of care, a physician is subject to 
liability through medical malpractice?49 To bring a successful lawsuit against a team physician 
for a concussion-related negligence, the player has to establish the following elements: 1) a duty 
owed to the plaintiff based upon doctor-patient relationship; 2) a breach of the standard of care; 
3) an injury; and 4) a causal connection between the breach and injury?50 
The team physician's number one priority is to care for the player's health above all 
else?51 However, a team physician faces many issues in treating a player that arise from a 
conflict of interest. Offensive lineman Pete Kendall summed up this conflict of interest, "I see 
guys playing in games that I don't think a personal advocate would allow them to do ... the doctor 
who is supposed to be looking out for you is also the same guy who may put you into a game 
that the team has to win. You're mixing business with medicine."252 There is no denying that a 
team is more fmancially successful if it wins games and thus it has a monetary interest in 
keeping its players on the field. 
A physician can be conflicted when the interests of management253 and the player do not 
coincide. Situations can arise in which a physician feels his or her job security may be 
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threatened by placing the health interests of a player above management's desires. For example, 
if a team was to pressure a physician to make a decision that was not consistent with sound 
medical practice, a moral dilemma would arise over whether to serve the team or the player.254 
The doctor must both properly diagnose the injury and treat it so that the player can return to the 
field and perform for the physician's employer?55 On at least one occasion, a physician has 
resigned because of this conflict. In his resignation statement, Cincinnati Reds team doctor 
Michael Lawhon complained of dishonesty from the front office and misleading reports on 
injuries. 256 The conflict of interest scenario has even been portrayed in football movies such as 
Any Given Sunday and Varsity Blues. In fact, it played out in real life as well when former NFL 
player Charlie Krueger won his lawsuit which alleged that the team physician fraudulently 
concealed information about his knee injury?57 This realization may cause an athlete to think 
twice about the medical diagnosis given by his team's physician. 
Physicians may also face pressure from the NFL player himself who knows that his 
livelihood is dependent on his being healthy enough to play. A player does not always have his 
own best health interests in mind. Often times, he is more worried about losing his job than his 
own well-being?58 NFL QB Matt Cassel confirmed this when he said, "Someone once told me, 
which I agree, you never want to see someone else doing your job and the mentality, as always, 
is to get back as soon as I can."259 It has gotten to the point that team physicians have to practice 
''detective medicine" because players will deny having any medical ailments in order to be part 
of a professional team. 260 
Despite any culpability that may arise from a conflict of interest, the co-employee 
doctrine of workers' compensation law will shield a team physician liability since it is likely the 
physician is a direct employee of the team. Since 1991, the common practice is for teams to 
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designate the team physician as an employee which then subjects him or her to the co-employee 
doctrine.261 Workers' compensation laws insure that, "injured workers no longer have to 
establish negligence attributable to their employer in order to obtain legal redress. They merely 
have to demonstrate that their conditions arose out of and during the course of their 
employment."262 Due to this heightened protection, most states have eliminated a private cause 
of action for injuries that are covered by workers compensation?63 From this immunity arises 
the "co-employee" doctrine which acts as a means to allow injured workers to exercise a private 
cause of action against an employer.264 This means the cause of action would be directed against 
the team, not the team doctor. 
The doctrine states, "An employer may become a third person, vulnerable to tort suit by 
an employee, if- and only if- it possesses a second persona so completely independent from and 
unrelated to its status as employer that by established standards the law recognizes that persona 
as a separate legal person."265 Therefore, a team physician is not a separate legal person and thus 
immune from suit under the workers compensation laws of most states.266 Since the NFL's 
Collective Bargaining Agreement ("CBA") mandates workers' compensation benefits to its 
players, the players can be left without a civil remedy if injured. 267 Perhaps a ray of hope was 
provided for NFL players in the dissenting opinion in Stringer v. Minn. Vikings Football Club, 
LLC, 705 N.W.2d 746, 763 (Minn. 2005), which expressed policy concerns with laws that 
provide blanket immunity to physicians since it can lead to their use of a lower standard of 
care?68 Nevertheless, if a player wants to sue a team physician for malpractice, he will have to 
sue the team under agency law to recover. Thus, it is likely a physician would not have to resort 
to defenses such as contributory negligence or assumption of risk by the player to avoid liability 
for his injuries. 
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VIII. The Potential Liability of Helmet Manufacturers 
This section will explore whether an NFL player who suffers a head injury may also be 
able to recovery from Riddell, the exclusive helmet manufacturer and provider for the NFL. 
Numerous suits against helmet manufacturers have been brought both on the theory of 
negligence and strict liability which shed light on whether Riddell may be subject to liability. 
The holdings suggest Riddell will not be liable as long as it does not ignore its duty to warn the 
user of its product or manufacture a negligently designed product. 
The plaintiff in Rawlings Sporting Goods Co. v. Daniels was a high school quarterback 
who suffered an injury from a head-to-head collision that resulted in permanent brain damage?69 
What was unique about this case was that the collision caused an indentation in the plaintiff's 
helmet. The plaintiff claimed Rawlings was negligent in failing to warn him that its helmet 
would not protect him from a subdural hematoma. 270 The court held that, "every manufacturer 
had a duty to warn of dangers in the use of its product of which it knows or should know. "271 
Therefore, provided that Riddell warns the NFL and its players that its helmets will not prevent 
all injuries, it can avoid liability resulting from head trauma. 
In another case involving a high-school quarterback, the plaintiff successfully sued 
Riddell for negligent design and misrepresentation?72 The plaintiff alleged that the lining in the 
helmet was insufficient and put forth evidence of helmet testing standards. The plaintiff 
presented evidence of Riddell's in-house records of testing, which showed that it inadequately 
and minimally investigated the relationship between the helmet design and neck injury. 273 Thus, 
to avoid liability in a lawsuit brought by a player, Riddell must do all the necessary testing 
relating to injuries and head trauma. Given the current scrutiny and attention being given to 
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concussions, it is likely Riddell has committed the necessary resources to testing its professional 
football helmets. 
Several cases have also been brought under the strict liability theory. For strict liability, 
courts have held that the risks of playing football are so obvious that a warning would only 
inform the wearer of what he already kn.ows. 274 Thus, for a plaintiff to be successful in a strict 
liability lawsuit against a manufacturer, the plaintiff must prove there was an existing defect in 
the design of the helmet. Byrns v. Riddell was another high school football case in which the 
plaintiff suffered a head injury during a game while wearing a Riddell helmet.275 The plaintiff 
produced a witness to attempt to show that Riddell helmets had a design defect that was 
inherently dangerous since it transmitted shock to the head. The appellate court held that the 
evidence revealed further testing could have found a defect in the design and thus it precluded a 
directed verdict issued by the trial court. 276 
In Durkee v. Cooper of Canada, Ltd., the Court held that the proper test for manufacturer 
liability was whether it had failed to protect against a risk that was unreasonable and foreseeable 
by the manufacturer?77 Accordingly, to avoid liability, Riddell must be sure its testing 
procedures meet the appropriate standards of design and give the NFL adequate warning to 
prevent negligence suits, since the risks of head trauma and concussions are widely recognized 
and foreseeable. It seems an NFL player's best chance to successfully sue Riddell for head 
injury would be to put forth expert testimony relating to defect in the helmet design or 
inadequate testing procedures. Of the three potential defendants discussed, this course of action 
is the least likely to result in a successful verdict for an NFL player. 
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The NFL should be aware that it is likely going to have to defend "concussion lawsuits" 
in the future. In fact, New Mexico Senator Tom Udall recently sent a letter to the Federal Trade 
Commission requesting an investigation and accusing Riddell for ''misleading marketing claims" 
relating to the safety of its helmets.278 Riddell's website promoted that, "research shows a 31 
percent reduction in the risk of concussions in players wearing a Riddell Revolution football 
helmet when compared with traditional helmets."279 Udall took issue with the claim, alleging 
that the statistics were unsubstantiated?80 A significant result of the concussion issue becoming 
highly publicized is that juries are likely to be informed and thus possibly be sympathetic to the 
plaintiff. The NFL must continue to take this issue seriously, as if its future was hanging in the 
balance. Some have started to speculate that if it does not, there may not be a league a few 
decades from now. 281 
IX.. Potential Solutions: An Upcoming Opportunity for the NFL 
The NfL is at a crossroads in its history, despite surpassing baseball long ago as the most 
popular sport in the United States?82 The league has made positive changes to address its issue 
with concussions in the last few years, starting with its public acknowledgement that concussions 
can cause future health issues. 283 The NFL has also recently announced that it will implement 
standardized concussion-evaluation procedures that will help determine whether a player is 
healthy enough to return to the game. 284 The mandatory guidelines will incorporate a 
neurological, cognitive, and balance test.285 The NFL is doing a much better job of educating its 
players and making them more aware of the severity of concussions. In recent years, the NFL 
has increased awareness, changed rules and policies, and has tried to improve its helmets. It has 
also implemented mandatory procedures for its teams to follow before allowing a player to return 
to play, thus not allowing the teams to have total control over monitoring player concussions, as 
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they have in the past. Furthermore, the NFL has fined its players enormous amounts of money 
for hits to the head and should continue to do so. Despite these positive changes, more can be 
done to insure the future of the league. The NFL must utilize the current negotiations with the 
NFLP A to make additional changes to its concussion policy and incorporate new rules that will 
protect the safety of its players. 
A. Leather Helmets 
Many have argued that the NFL must improve its helmets. One suggestion has been to 
add an inflatable inner sack to absorb a blow to the head and reduce shock to the brain. 286 
Another suggestion has been to add a polyurethane secondary helmet, a ''Pro Cap," that attaches 
to the primary helmet to help reduce shock to the brain. 287 Most proposed solutions suggest 
improving the current helmet in some form. The NFL should ignore those suggestions and take 
the exact opposite approach in its attempt to reduce its players' head injuries. 
The first thing the NFL should do to alleviate head injuries is to implement a leather 
helmet similar to the one invented by Paul Bro-vvn288 th.at was used U1'1til the trJd 1950s. The l'JFL 
should outlaw the use of any polymers or non-leather material in the manufacturing of its 
helmets. At first thought, this may seem radical and unnecessary. Nevertheless, some of the 
most respected NFL players and coaches have suggested this change would limit the violence 
and head injuries in the NFL. 289 A state-of-the-art helmet makes a defender less fearful of using 
his body as a projectile. The late, legendary coach Bill Walsh argued that the extra protection of 
a helmet allows a player "to play with more abandon and that means increasingly harder hits. "290 
Hall of Fame safety Ronnie Lott was one of the fiercest hitters to ever play football. Yet, he 
agrees with Bill Walsh and admits that a change in equipment would have changed the way he 
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played. "If they took away half my padding, they'd take away half my power."291 Ironically, the 
improvements made to helmets seem to the have made the game less safe. Hall of Fame 
quarterback and FOX analyst Troy Aikman also advocates the idea of the NFL returning to the 
use of leather helmets?92 He has gone so far as to say that if he was to ever have a son, he would 
not allow him to play football because of how dangerous the sport has become?93 
Contrarians argue that football is an inherently violent game and no amount of fines, 
suspensions, or equipment improvements will change the game.294 That logic is misguided. 
Football is a dangerous game, just as war is dangerous. However, the current helmets make it a 
more dangerous game, just as nuclear weapons make war a more dangerous endeavor. Changing 
the helmets does not turn football into a non-violent game. Nor should it change the way it has 
always been played. It would merely prevent defenders from playing recklessly with no regard 
for their health. Unless the NFL changes the fundamental rules of the game, it will not alter the 
game that has become so popular simply by changing its helmets. 
B. The Collective Bargaining Agreement ("CBA") 
The CBA is the governing document that regulates what rights the teams and its players 
have. It also controls the interactions between the NFL and the NFLP A. Arbitration is used to 
settle disputes that arise from the terms of the CBA. 295 The NFL can use the upcoming 
negotiations of the new CBA to implement new rules and policies that will help reduce exposing 
its players to CTE in the future. As discussed, the current contracting policy incentivizes players 
to hide their concussions. 296 As much as the owners will fight it, the league must force its teams 
to guarantee player contracts in some form. Even if it just means enforcing a minimum amount 
of years that must be guaranteed, something must be done. We should look no further than the 
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situations of Ted Johnson and Wayne Chrebet to understand why this is necessary.297 By doing 
this, the NFL would also rebut a player's argument that he felt pressure to play through a 
concussion. Under the current system, the team is given most of the power when negotiating a 
contract with a player. If the NFL wants to remain in business, it must give some power back to 
its players by guaranteeing contracts, as is done in the other three major professional sports. A 
player will be less inclined to risk further head trauma by prematurely re-entering a game if his 
contract was guaranteed and his job was secure. 
The NFL can also use the upcoming CBA to change the liability immunity that is 
currently given to its physicians. The NFLP A should fight to gain greater protection against 
malpractice by team physicians?98 The team physician will often be exempt from liability if the 
player can collect workers' compensation for his injuries. 299 This policy should be changed in 
the upcoming CBA. The NFL should make its team physicians subject to tort liability for 
medical malpractice. If this policy were adopted, it is anticipated that the physician will be more 
likely to put the player's health interests above the interests of management or the team. One 
suggestion offered is to make the physicians league employees, rather than team employees. 300 
Perhaps this would ms.ke them more independent and less beholden to a specific team. For 
example, the Packers trainer received both a Super Bowl ring and Super Bowl bonus this past 
year.301 Clearly, this conflict of interest may cause a trainer to put the team's interests first. One 
thing is obvious, the NFL should not allow its team physicians to continue to practice free from , 
the threat of liability. 
Another issue that will be discussed in the upcoming labor negotiations is the length of 
the NFL season. The NFL should not extend its schedule by two games per season. If it tries, 
the players should vehemently oppose this proposal. An eighteen game season is an unnecessary 
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change that is being driven by the greed of a few owners. The league cannot justify extending 
the season to include more games, considering the knowledge it now has regarding the risks 
posed by concussions. The NFLP A has stated publicly that an eighteen game season is not in the 
best interest of player safety, so it is not even on the negotiating table from their point ofview.302 
They should not allow an increase in money to persuade them to soften this stance. NFL players 
already incur too many hits to the head during a sixteen game season. The NFLP A should 
bargain to get the NFL to keep track of hits to the head. The NFL can simply designate a person 
to each team for the entire season to accomplish this. If baseball teams keep pitch counts to 
protect the arm of a pitcher, there is no reason that the NFL cannot track hits to the head or at 
least force its teams to do so. 
The NFL should also continue to educate its players on the long-term health risks of 
playing football as it has done over the past few years, so that players' participation amounts to 
informed consent. If a player is fully aware of the health risks he assumes by playing football, it 
may make him more conscious of his safety. The NFL should also limit the amount of contact 
allowed by its teams in practice. Research has concluded that a person develops CTE from 
repeated trauma to the head, not just one concussion. 303 Therefore, repeated hitting in practice 
exacerbates the problem. This has been demonstrated in the cases of several former players, 
including Merril Hoge and Ted Johnson. Lastly, the NFL has been more receptive to working 
with the CSTE and the SLI to try to provide them with the brains of former players for 
research?04 The league should take it a step further and openly embrace that relationship, 
making each entity a business partnet. Independent research can only help the NFL learn more 
about the effects that concussions have on its players. 
C. Congressional Oversight 
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The NFL should attempt to get Congress more involved in the regulation and the 
oversight of the concussion problem in the NFL. Congress has already held several hearings 
thus far, as the NFL has been questioned as to what it is doing to protect its players' safety. 
Continued Congressional oversight will incentivize the league to continue to monitor and 
research concussions in a way that the threat of litigation may not. This health issue presents a 
much more serious problem than past sports issues that Congress has spent its resources 
investigating.305 Furthermore, if concussions continue to plague the NFL ten years from now, it 
is likely Congress would then take even more drastic measures and possible exert some control 
over the league. If the concussion problem continues to worsen, perhaps Congress can 
implement a law that would limit tackling in youth leagues until adolescence. The root of the 
problem starts with childhood, from which time most professionals have been playing football. 
Limiting tackling in children's leagues is perhaps another means to fight the concussion problem. 
However, we have not yet come to that point. For the time being, Congressional oversight 
should suffice to ensure the NFL continues to treat its concussion problem seriously. 
X. Conclusion 
Former running back Eric Shelton recently filed a lawsuit claiming that the league's 
disability plan withheld benefits for an injury caused by a helmet-to-helmet hit.306 Shelton 
alleges the league incorrectly awarded him benefits for "degenerative" impairments as opposed to 
the maximum benefit for an injury that causes immediate, permanent harm. 307 The NFL is 
likely to encounter similar lawsuits after publicly acknowledging that concussions can lead to 
future cognitive impairment. This admission has opened the door for liability to those who 
played during the era when the NFL denied there were any cognitive risks taken by playing 
professional footbalL The Shelton lawsuit should serve as a predictor for what is to come. 
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It is rumored that there are two class-action suits against the NFL which are expected to 
be filed by the summer of201 1.308 The lawsuits will be filed by former players and will focus on 
what knowledge the league had in regards to the long-term effects of concussions before 2009. 
The NFL may be liable to players who sustained head injuries during the time when the NFL 
publicly denied there were any long-term effects to concussions. Nevertheless, the league has 
done a much better job publicly acknowledging the issue and putting procedures in place to 
protect the health of its players the last few years. 
Despite the legal ramifications involved, recurring head injuries also present sociological 
and cultural concerns that may affect the NFL in the future. Lawsuits will not bankrupt the NFL. 
However, the sheer brutality of the sport potentially may have dire consequences. Some have 
speculated that football will become a sport played only by the lower-class.309 Comparatively, 
the brutality of boxing has prompted the World Medical Association and the British Medical 
Association to suggest all forms of the sport should be banned.310 The NFL hopes that its sport 
does not turn into a culture of regret. Only time will reveal what the future holds for the NFL. 
One thing is certain: the health risks have caused us to consider something we could not have 
fathomed just ten years ago. Are we sure the NFL will exist a few decades from now? 
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